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The Evolution of Military Systems during the Hundred Years War
James Smither
Faculty Mentor
The Hundred Years War (1337-1453) 
was a crucial period in the evolution of  
European warfare. By the end of  the 
conflict, the traditional means by which 
Europeans conducted warfare had 
changed dramatically. The age of  the 
armored knight had essentially ended 
and military gallantry was replaced with 
practicality. The war ushered in a new 
age of  warfare; the reliance on feudal 
levies diminished, making way for more 
professionalized, standing armies. This 
shift carried on into the early modern 
era, which military historians have 
categorized as a military revolution. 
The military revolution thesis argues 
that the emergence of  professional, 
wage based armies, as well as the rising 
prominence of  gunpowder weaponry 
created an unparalleled period of  
military innovation. Medieval military 
historians have successfully linked the 
Hundred Years War to the military 
revolution thesis; however, the majority 
of  attention is given to the English. Their 
initial reliance on paid infantry coupled 
with an abundance of  English centered 
scholarship has made the English 
connection to the military revolution 
clearly defined. French military efforts are 
discussed only in regard to Charles VII’s 
military reforms that allowed the French 
to win the war. While Charles VII’s 
military reforms were an important piece 
of  the military revolution, the largely 
unanalyzed period of  French resurgence 
during the reign of  Charles V was just 
as revolutionary. The reign of  Charles 
V, when France set aside traditional 
medieval tactics, had a significant 
influence not only on Charles VII’s 
reforms, but the overarching evolution of  
European warfare.
 In 1955, historian Michael Roberts 
introduced the idea of  a military 
revolution. Roberts’ idea of  the military 
revolution, characterized the early 
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modern era, particularly 1560-1660, as 
a period of  vast military change. As the 
medieval period came to an end, new 
weapons, tactics, and military systems 
were adopted by European countries. Out 
of  the shadow of  feudalism, professional, 
wage based armies emerged. Unlike the 
feudal armies of  the medieval period, 
early modern military systems were 
formed on the idea that they would be 
standing armies. Though the men who 
composed these units may not have 
been professional troops from time of  
recruitment, prolonged enlistments 
molded them into highly effective 
and professional forces. According to 
Roberts, armies of  the early modern era 
were unlike “ a collection of  bellicose 
individuals, in the feudal style; it was 
to be an articulated organism of  which 
each part responded to the impulses 
from above.”1 A centralized command 
structure would prove far more effective 
than a horde of  feudal levies.
 Geoffrey Parker, in his work The 
Military Revolution, expanded the concept 
previously introduced by Roberts. What 
is particularly notable of  Parker’s work is 
the fact that he extended the revolution’s 
reach. In his discussion of  the increased 
reliance on infantry in the early modern 
era, Parker pays tribute to English archers 
during the 14th and 15th centuries. During 
the Hundred Years War, English archers 
essentially dominated in pitched battles. 
It was because of  the reliance on missile 
weapons such as the English longbow 
during the latter medieval period that 
handheld gunpowder weapons were so 
attractive to early modern European 
armies.2 Initial analysis of  the Hundred 
Years War, coupled with the reliance on 
ranged weaponry, reveals that the English 
were among the first European nations to 
enter this period of  military innovation. 
Analogous to English strategy at Crécy 
(1346) and Agincourt (1415), volley 
1. Michael Roberts, Essays in Swedish History (Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press, 1967), 198.
2. Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of  the West 1500-1800, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 16.
3. Ibid., 19.
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 The need for French military 
reform was apparent from the first 
major engagements. The opening stages 
of  the Hundred Years War proved 
devastating for the French. The tenacity 
of  Edward III resulted in a resounding 
victory at Crécy in 1346. Historians have 
attributed Edward’s victory at Crécy 
to his longbowmen. The longbow, a 
bow stave nearly six feet long with 100 
to 150 pounds of  draw force, proved 
deadly in the hands of  a well-practiced 
Englishman. When positioned in an 
open field of  battle, English longbowmen 
inflicted heavy casualties against any 
foe with the zeal to meet them head on. 
Edward’s order of  battle at Crécy on 
August 26, 1346, consisted of  two bodies 
of  longbowmen flanking a central force 
of  dismounted men at arms.8 The French 
force under Philip VI, relying heavily 
on the shock factor of  a large force of  
mounted knights, took heavy casualties 
as they charged Edward’s position. These 
tactics proved futile, for when the battle 
was over, nearly 1,500 French knights lay 
dead. 9 Crécy was a sign for both sides 
that the war would not be brief  and that 
the traditional tactics of  the mounted 
knight were becoming obsolete.
 With the momentum leaning in 
favor of  England, Edward, the Prince 
of  Wales, otherwise known as the Black 
Prince, organized a series of  raids in 1355 
and 1356. His campaigns relied on a 
strategy referred to as a chevauchée (literally 
translated as cavalcade). The chevauchée 
was a strategy which used the destruction 
of  farmlands, looting, rape, and murder 
as a means of  demoralizing French rural 
populations and damaging their ability 
to support an army.10 Edward’s grand 
strategy proved more lucrative than any 
Englishman could have imagined; apart 
from the loot taken from French towns, 
the English claimed yet another major 
victory over the French. During the 1356 
raid, a French force shadowed the Prince 
of  Wales, looking for the opportunity to 
This remarkable investment in artillery 
allowed French commanders to engage in 
pitched battles with the English without 
fear of  being outgunned.6 The large 
artillery train assembled by the French 
proved deadly, especially at Castillon in 
1453. The military doctrine of  Charles 
VII was one centered on artillery and 
a large, professionalized standing army. 
With his newly reformed military, Charles 
effectively expelled the English from 
France, bringing an end to the war.
 Rogers successfully links the Hundred 
Years War to the military revolution; 
however, the period of  French resurgence 
in the latter half  of  the 14th century is 
left undiscussed. This is likely due to the 
small amount of  scholarship dedicated 
to the French. Far more material is 
available from the English point of  view; 
this influx of  Anglo-centric scholarship 
makes the task of  acknowledging French 
military accomplishments during this time 
difficult. With a lack of  Franco-centric 
scholarship, biases emerge. An example 
of  this can been seen in a discussion 
about Bertrand du Guesclin, Constable of  
France during the reign of  Charles V. Du 
Guesclin, who will later be discussed in 
detail, carried out a guerrilla war against 
the English. Dismissal of  his tactics is 
illustrated by French historian Edouard 
Perroy, who categorized du Guesclin as a 
“mediocre captain, incapable of  winning 
a battle or being successful in a siege of  
any scope, just good enough to put new 
life into the bands of  pillaging routiers”7 
While Perroy’s work on the Hundred 
Years War is a useful guide in any study 
of  the war, a broad selection of  source 
material is needed to accurately support 
the effectiveness of  du Guesclin’s tactics. 
The small amount of  Franco-centric 
scholarship makes it difficult to paint 
an accurate picture of  figures such as 
du Guesclin, regardless of  a particular 
author’s nationality. In order to avoid 
information gaps and cultural bias, a 
variety of  scholarship must be utilized.
firing became a benchmark of  European 
warfare by the 16th century. These new 
armies, including those who opposed 
them, were required to spread themselves 
out in order maximize the output of  
fire and to reduce their own casualties.3 
As seen in the English victories of  the 
Hundred Years War, those failing to take 
the proper precautions against massed 
missile fire were likely to meet disaster.
Among the most prominent analyses 
of  military change in the Hundred 
Years War is Clifford J. Rogers’ “The 
Military Revolutions of  the Hundred 
Years War.” Rogers argues that the 
military significance of  the Hundred 
Years War can be attributed to two major 
revolutions; the infantry revolution and 
the artillery revolution. The infantry 
revolution, according to Rogers, is a 
concept adopted by the English; their 
use of  longbowmen allowed them to 
dominate in pitched battles. Additionally, 
Rogers argues that the enfranchisement of  
men of  lesser social status had large effects 
on the level of  battlefield carnage. This 
large, wage based force, caring little for 
the chivalric ways of  their social superiors, 
were much more likely to kill their enemy 
as opposed to capturing him.4 This led 
to tremendous numbers of  casualties, 
particularly among the French, whose 
armies consisted mainly of  feudal levies. 
Rogers also states that the failure on part 
of  the French to produce an effective force 
of  archers led to many of  their failures 
throughout the war.5 According to him, 
the French would not enter the sphere 
of  military revolution until the reign of  
Charles VII, when they adopted massed 
artillery.
 Although artillery had been used 
throughout the war, Rogers argues that 
the artillery revolution truly manifested 
itself  during the later years of  the war and 
did so primarily in the French military. 
By 1453, the French were spending 
more than twice the money on artillery 
compared to other facets of  the military. 
4. Clifford J Rogers. The Military Revolutions of  the Hundred Years’ War. The Journal of  Military History 57, no. 2 (April 1993): 256.
5. Ibid., 251.
6. Ibid., 274.
7. Edouard Perroy, The Hundred Years War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959), 148.
8. Jonathon Sumption, The Hundred Years War: Trial by Battle (Philadelphia: University of  Pennsylvania Press, 1991), 526-527.
9. Ibid., 528-530.
10. H.J. Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books, 2004), 46.
11. Desmond Seward, The Hundred Years War: The English in France 1337-1453 (New York: Atheneum, 1978), 88-91.
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April 12, after failing to bring the French 
to battle, Edward withdrew from the city. 
By the end of  the month, Edward’s forces 
had reached their breaking point, forcing 
Edward to call a diplomatic meeting, one 
which resulted in the treaty of  Brétigny.15 
Charles’ strategy had not only prevented 
a disaster the likes of  Crécy, it had also 
birthed a period of  French military 
reform.
Though the English had not suffered 
a devastating loss on the level of  Crécy or 
Poitiers, the invasion of  1359 was largely 
a failure. The Dauphin Charles had 
learned from the mistakes of  his father 
and grandfather. The scorched earth 
policy Charles enacted took the initiative 
away from the English who, due to their 
difficulties in supplying large armies, 
depended on foraging for survival. If  
Crécy and Poitiers had taught the French 
anything, it was that the current French 
military system was unfit for open field 
combat with English archers. While one 
can attribute Charles’ unwillingness to 
fight a pitched battle to a possible lack 
of  manpower following the disaster at 
Poitiers, the effectiveness of  his strategy 
cannot be ignored. The English invasion 
of  1359 proved that the French were 
clearly capable of  success as long as they 
possessed a willingness to adapt. Although 
Charles’ military doctrine was just 
beginning to form during this time, it was 
clear that under his authority, France had 
a fighting chance.
The Treaty of  Brétigny introduced a 
period of  peace as well as a new challenge 
for the French monarch. The state of  
the English economy was such that 
maintaining a large standing army was 
out of  the question. Bands of  unemployed 
mercenaries who had previously fought 
in English armies, known in France as 
the routiers, wrought havoc amongst the 
French populace. What made these “free 
companies” particularly threatening 
was the fact that they were professional 
soldiers. Composed of  English, Breton, 
into the campaign, supplies dwindled. In 
order for Edward to effectively maintain 
his army, foraging became necessary; 
however, the French Dauphin Charles 
(who would later become Charles V) 
made foraging increasingly difficult. In 
his strategy to combat Edward’s advance, 
Charles adopted a scorched earth policy. 
At the command of  the Dauphin, the 
French countryside in the path of  the 
English army was abandoned and burned; 
the citizens who lived in these areas were 
ordered to take what supplies they could 
carry and move into larger fortresses. 
Supplies that the inhabitants could not 
carry were burned, denying Edward’s 
army the supplies they desperately 
needed. The French populace lying in the 
path of  the English advance stayed within 
the confines of  fortresses. Additionally, 
mounted troops were often sent forth from 
the towns to harass English foragers.13 
With this simple, yet prudent strategy, 
Charles began to effectively neutralize 
the English force. Without proper 
supplies, Edward’s time in France became 
increasingly limited, creating a dire need 
for a tactical victory.
 The need for logistical support 
turned Edward’s grand campaign from 
one of  conquest to one of  desperation. 
From December 4, 1359 to January 11, 
1360, Edward’s army encircled the city 
of  Rennes. Fortunately for the city’s 
defense, Charles’ scorched earth policy 
left the besiegers lacking in supplies. 
Having failed to take the city by storm in 
January, Edward was forced to retreat.14 
Logistical deficiencies kept Edward’s army 
relatively inactive until early March when 
they moved toward the city of  Paris in 
hopes of  forcing Charles to sue for peace. 
On April 7, Edward’s army arrived just 
south of  Paris to find that the Parisians 
had burned the southern suburbs of  the 
city and retreated behind the walls. For 
several days, the English attempted to 
draw the French army into the open; the 
dauphin’s troops did not take the bait. On 
avenge Crécy and the destruction of  their 
lands. The English army positioned itself  
near the town of  Poitiers and waited to 
receive the French, led by King John II, 
son of  Philip VI. Unlike the French force 
at Crécy, John’s army was almost entirely 
dismounted. The battle commenced with 
a French cavalry charge of  300 knights 
who were given the task of  eliminating 
the English archers, enabling the infantry 
to approach the English men at arms 
unchallenged. The cavalry charge 
ultimately failed and as a result, the 
infantry attack took merciless fire from 
the English flanks. As devastating as the 
arrow fire was, the English struggled to 
keep the numerically superior French at 
bay. Fortunately for the Prince of  Wales, 
a force of  150 mounted men at arms and 
archers under the Captal de Buch, hit the 
French from behind. John’s army, thinking 
the Captal’s troops were more numerous 
than they actually were, retreated in 
confusion.11 The battle of  Poitiers was a 
humiliating French defeat that resulted in 
the capture of  King John II. The simple 
act of  dismounting the army was far 
from the military reform France required. 
These tactical shortcomings allowed 
the English to expand their holdings in 
France to more than twice what they had 
been prior to 1337. However, with John 
II out of  the picture, his son Charles took 
control. Charles, unlike his predecessors, 
knew how to neutralize the combat 
effectiveness of  an English army. It was 
during his reign that France set aside the 
chivalric ideals of  medieval warfare and 
began to fight a different war.
 Edward III’s last campaign in 1359 
saw the early stages of  a new French 
strategy. The campaign was an immense 
logistical undertaking. Knowing that 
the French countryside, particularly the 
Champagne region, was devastated by 
the conflict, Edward arranged a supply 
train of  over 1,000 wagons.12 Edward’s 
10,000 man force set out from Calais on 
November 4th 1359; less than two weeks 
12. Jonathon Sumption, The Hundred Years War: Trial by Fire (Philadelphia: University of  Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 425.
13. Ibid., 427
14. Ibid., 431
15. Sumption, Trial by Fire, 442-444.
16. Perroy, The Hundred Years War, 154.
17. Ibid., 155.
18. Seward, The Hundred Years War, 106.
19. Richard Vernier, The Flower of  Chivalry: Bertrand du Guesclin and the Hundred Years War (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2003), 21.
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this army. With the addition of  a small 
number of  French knights, du Guesclin’s 
army numbered nearly 12,000 men.22 The 
recruitment of  the routiers not only relieved 
Charles V of  a great headache, it also put 
du Guesclin at the head of  an army of  
professional soldiers.
 The professional nature of  the 
routiers was not the sole characteristic 
that separated them from the traditional 
Feudal levies that fought the English 
at Crécy and Poitiers. Similar to the 
armies fielded by Edward III and the 
Black Prince, the routiers were wage based 
troops. In order to effectively bring them 
under an appropriate level of  control, du 
Guesclin organized a system of  payment. 
This task seems to be one to which he 
was well suited; according to popular 
legend, du Guesclin was very successful 
in acquiring payment from Charles V 
for these troops.23 His ability to acquire 
payment for this routier force was a large 
factor in the army’s success. Du Guesclin’s 
correspondence shows that he was in fact 
successful in acquiring money from the 
French monarch for this army:
A touz ceuls qui ces presentes lettres 
verront, Bertran du Guerclin, chevalier, 
conte de Longueville, chambellan du Roy 
de France, mon tresredoubté et souverain 
seigneur, salut. Savoir faisons que parmi 
certaine somme de derniers que le dit roy 
mon souverain seigneur nous a pieca fait 
bailler en prest, tant pour mettre hors de 
son royaume les compaignies qui estoient 
es parties de Bretaigne, de Normandie 
et de Chart[r]ain et ailleurs es basses 
marches….24
The money allocated by Charles 
allowed du Guesclin to recruit the 
larger, more organized groups of  these 
companies from various areas throughout 
France. By the end of  1365, du Guesclin 
and his army of  routiers departed for 
the most notable of  Bertrand’s exploits 
during this time was performed during 
the siege of  Rennes in 1342. The English-
held city was retaken by du Guesclin in 
a manner uncustomary to the chivalric 
ways of  the time. Posing as woodcutters, 
du Guesclin and his men were admitted 
into the city. Upon entry du Guesclin 
and the accompanying force dispatched 
the English garrison.20 This Trojan horse 
style of  fighting exemplified du Guesclin’s 
military ethos. Throughout the early 
stages of  his military career, du Guesclin 
made a name for himself  as a guerrilla 
fighter. It was only fitting that Charles V, 
whose military practices in 1359 reflected 
this asymmetrical warfare, went to him for 
assistance in ridding France of  the routiers.
War between England and France 
perpetuated well beyond the boundaries 
of  the two respective countries. In the 
latter half  of  1365, civil war erupted in 
the Iberian country of  Castile. France had 
been on good terms with the Castilians 
until Charles V’s sister- in- law Blanche 
de Bourbon, wife to the unfaithful King 
Pedro of  Castile, died by mysterious 
circumstances. To deteriorate relations 
further, Pedro (often referred to as Pedro 
the Cruel) signed a treaty, aligning himself  
with King Edward III.21 The French 
would seek recompense for the death 
of  Blanche de Bourbon, the demise of  
Pedro, and the accession of  Enrique de 
Trastamara, an illegitimate son of  Pedro 
I’s father, to the throne. In support of  
Enrique, Charles V ordered du Guesclin 
to organize an army of  routiers for an 
expedition into Castile. The routiers 
composing this force included many from 
the Breton region, men who had fought 
against du Guesclin during the Breton 
Civil War. Additionally, those who either 
occupied fortresses or were likely going 
to remain in France, were chosen for 
Spanish, and German mercenaries, these 
companies ran rampant through the 
French countryside.16 The routiers made 
their living in the exploitation of  civilians; 
their activities included kidnapping 
French citizens for ransom, storming 
towns and villages, selling safe passage 
on the roads, as well as theft of  food 
supplies.17 The routiers also had a tendency 
to form large groups known as the 
“Grand Companies”. These companies 
such as those led by the infamous Arnaud 
de Cervole, the Archpriest, accrued large 
amounts of  wealth from the relentless 
theft and murder of  French civilians. 
During the early 1360s, the French 
government lacked the power to solve 
the routier problem militarily. The absence 
of  a French response forced lords to pay 
these companies off in order to prevent 
the destruction of  their property. Other 
than a crusade against the Turks that 
never materialized, few efforts were made 
to rid France of  the routiers.18 Luckily for 
Charles, the year 1365 presented him with 
an opportunity to solve the problem of  
the companies. Rather than attempting 
the laborious task of  quelling the routiers 
by force, Charles incorporated them into 
the expeditionary force sent to the Iberian 
Peninsula to fight a war of  succession 
in Castile. The man who led this army 
thrived in the warfare style of  the routiers; 
his name was Bertrand du Guesclin.
Du Guesclin, unlike the common 
French lord, was not born into gallantry. 
The only surviving record of  his 
childhood shows that his parents wished 
him dead, for he was an especially 
ugly child.19 An outsider from birth, du 
Guesclin found solace in warfare and 
violence. Rising to prominence during 
the Breton Civil War, du Guesclin 
proved that he was more than capable of  
effectively fighting the English. One of  
20. Vernier, The Flower of  Chivalry, 43.
21. Ibid., 84.
22. Sumption, Trial by Fire, 529-530.
23. Vernier, The Flower of  Chivalry, 89.
24. Michael Jones, ed., Letters, Orders and Musters of  Bertrand du Guesclin, 1357-1380 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2004), 40-41. Translation: To all whom 
these letters will be presented, Bertrand du Guesclin, Count of  Longueville, Chamberlain of  the King of  France, my most my most respected and sovereign lord, 
salutations. Be it known that this sum of  money from the king my sovereign lord has been advanced to send out of  his kingdom the companies from parts of  
Brétigny, Normandy, the Chartrain, and other areas…
25. Vernier, The Flower of  Chivalry, 90.
26. Sumption, Trial by Fire, 533.
27. Jones, Letters Orders and Musters of  Bertrand du Guesclin, 55.
28. Vernier, The Flower of  Chivalry, 96. 
29. Vernier, The Flower of  Chivalry, 106.
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but the beginning of  a French resurgence.
 The English financial debacle in 
Castile provided Charles V with the 
perfect opportunity to begin the task of  
reclaiming southwestern France. The 
Castilian expedition had cost both the 
English and the French a large amount 
of  treasure, but the French allies were 
far more financially accommodating 
than Pedro I. As a result of  Pedro’s 
failure to deliver on his promises, the 
Black Prince looked to his lands in 
France for tax revenue. The Prince of  
Wales implemented a hearth tax upon 
his holdings in Aquitaine. Naturally, 
his subjects were infuriated at the idea 
of  paying for a campaign that yielded 
little financial gain.33 Despite the treaty 
of  Brétigny, inhabitants of  the Prince’s 
holdings began to flock to Charles with 
appeals. The Black Prince was summoned 
to Paris in January 1369 to answer for this 
unjust tax. The reply Charles received 
was “Sirs, we will gladly go to Paris, but 
I assure you that it shall be with helmet 
on our head and 60,000 men.”34 The 
insolence of  the Black Prince, coupled 
with a refusal to strike down the hearth 
tax, resulted in the renewing of  the war in 
June 1369.
 If  recent French military doctrine 
was any indication, one could ascertain 
that the French would certainly fight 
differently than they had prior to John 
II’s capture in 1356. Charles V’s new 
strategy needed a commander, one 
who was proven in guerrilla warfare. In 
1370, Charles appointed du Guesclin 
Constable of  France.35 The appointment 
of  du Guesclin was but a piece of  
Charles V reform of  the French military. 
The Castilian affair had shown how 
effective an army could be if  the troops 
The French success in Castile in 1366 was 
largely due to the ability of  du Guesclin 
and his allies to supply the army with 
wages. Though rather unorthodox, this 
professional force achieved far more than 
the French feudal levies of  Crécy and 
Poitiers.
 As successful as du Guesclin and 
his army of  routiers had been in 1366, 
the following year brought new troubles. 
Pedro I had survived the exploits of  
1366 and sought out an alliance with 
the English, hoping to reclaim Castile. 
As a result of  the pact with Pedro, the 
English recalled the routiers back into 
service, threatening the confiscation of  
any holdings in England if  they refused.29 
Without the professional army at his 
back, du Guesclin and his Castilian 
allies suffered a defeat at the battle of  
Nájera on April 2, 1367. Du Guesclin 
was captured by the Black Prince and 
remained in captivity until late 1369. 
The Prince of  Wales, having once again 
recruited the men of  the free companies, 
turned the tide of  the conflict in favor of  
Pedro I. However, the English war effort 
required the constant flow of  funds.30 
Pedro I had promised to fund the Black 
Prince’s expedition but was unable to 
acquire proper funding. This lack of  
reimbursement forced the Black Prince 
to tax his French holdings in Aquitaine; 
the English campaign in Spain had been 
an economic failure.31 In 1369, after 
English support had been withdrawn, 
Pedro I was cornered by Enrique and 
the recently released du Guesclin at the 
castle of  Montiel where he was killed by 
Enrique himself.32 The ultimate triumph 
of  Enrique de Trastamara, despite the 
unfortunate setback that was Nájera, was 
not only another success for Charles V, 
Spain. The brutal nature of  the routiers 
made it impossible to completely 
eliminate their violent tendencies as they 
moved south; however, there was no large 
scale destruction of  towns or villages 
as seen prior to their recruitment into 
the French military.25 As the campaign 
progressed, it became increasingly evident 
that the prospect of  payment was the only 
true shield against their fury.
 The brutal nature of  the routiers 
required a nearly constant flow of  
payment. Though the prospect of  wages 
kept a large amount of  the companies 
invested in the campaign, their destructive 
nature could not be completely controlled. 
The army entered Spain through the 
French allied kingdom of  Aragon, then 
ruled by King Peter IV; the 12,000 man 
force was the largest army that had 
entered Iberia in over a hundred years.26 
In order to keep the level of  destruction 
under control, Peter IV contributed vast 
amounts of  money to du Guesclin’s army. 
On one particular occasion in February 
of  1366, Peter authorized a large 
payment to one of  du Guesclin’s esquires 
in order to prevent the destruction of  
the modern-day city of  Huesca.27 The 
conduct of  the routier army imposed a 
significant time restraint on du Guesclin 
for neither the French nor the kingdom 
of  Aragon could afford to keep the routiers 
under one banner forever. Fortunately, 
once the campaign to place Henry of  
Trastamara on the throne began in 
late February in 1366, things came to a 
rather swift conclusion. After little more 
than a month, the campaign concluded 
and Enrique of  Trastamara was made 
King of  Castile. Du Guesclin’s army had 
encountered little resistance, likely due 
to the horrific reputation of  the routiers.28 
30. Seward, The Hundred Years War, 107.
31. Gordon Corrigan, A Great and Glorious Adventure: A History of  the Hundred Years War and the Birth of  Renaissance England (New York: Pegasus Books, 
2014), 176.
32. Jean Froissart, Chronicles, trans. Geoffrey Brereton (London: Penguin Books, 1968), 173.
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36. Jones, Letters, Orders and Musters of  Bertrand du Guesclin, 142. Translation: Bertrand du Guesclin, duke of  Molines, Constable of  France, to our friend Etienne 
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notable level of  destruction upon the 
French countryside, they were failing 
to lure French commanders into open 
battle.42 Reminiscent of  Edward III’s 
1359 campaign, the French populace was 
ordered to remain inside walled cities; the 
advice of  French commanders to Charles 
V was to “Let them go on. They cannot 
rob you of  your heritage with fires and 
smoke. They will grow tired and crumble 
away to nothing.”43 By early September, 
after nearly a month of  raiding, John 
of  Gaunt was still on the move, but had 
failed to bring the French out into the 
open.
 The raid began to truly decline when 
the English reached the city of  Troyes on 
the 21st of  September. John of  Gaunt’s 
army devastated the outlying area of  the 
city while the French remained behind 
the walls. After failing to force the French 
into battle before the walls of  the city, 
the English moved into the suburbs to 
attack. As the English proceeded, the 
French garrison launched a counterattack 
that claimed a number of  English lives 
(estimates range from 120 to 600).44 
To make matters worse, the western 
column of  the army (the English force 
had reformed into two columns by this 
time) was ambushed on September 27th. 
Though the French largely avoided battle 
during the raid, contingents of  French 
cavalry shadowed the English advance 
south. The trap was set by French 
commander Olivier de Clisson near the 
city of  Sens. A small force of  200 French 
cavalry was positioned nearly a mile away 
from the main French force of  nearly 
1,500 men near Sens. In pursuit of  the 
retreating cavalry, the English ran into de 
Clisson’s main body and suffered nearly 
600 casualties.45 Clisson’s ambush was 
the most devastating loss for the English 
during the raid and was irrefutable 
evidence that John of  Gaunt was failing 
his mission.
This strategy, commended by English 
historian Sir Charles Oman, involved the 
familiar willingness to sacrifice French 
lands.37 This strategy proved effective 
once again in the summer of  1369 and 
in 1370 when two consecutive raids 
were conducted by Sir Robert Knollys 
and John of  Gaunt. Both men achieved 
relative success in destroying French lands; 
however, the reluctance of  Charles V to 
give battle prevented any major gains.38 
Despite the reluctance to give battle, du 
Guesclin’s strategy was far from defensive. 
Rather than meeting the English in a 
pitched battle, du Guesclin and his band 
of  professional soldiers, conducted a 
guerrilla war. His policy included quick 
assaults on small garrisons, night attacks, 
and raids on English supply lines. Above 
all, du Guesclin would refuse battle with 
the English even if  he held a numerical 
advantage.39 Du Guesclin knew that 
England could not maintain a war with an 
enemy that could not be brought to battle; 
therefore attrition was key. He, along with 
other French commanders, was able to do 
this by moving quickly and maintaining 
strict discipline amongst small bodies 
of  troops.40 Perhaps the most notable 
instance of  this strategy at work was the 
1373 raid of  John of  Gaunt.
 The largest invasion during this 
period of  the war was John of  Gaunt’s 
raid of  1373 which saw the full effect of  
Charles V’s military doctrine. John of  
Gaunt, the third son of  King Edward III, 
intended to lead a large force from Calais 
to the beleaguered English holdings of  
Aquitaine in southwestern France.41 John 
of  Gaunt’s force of  5,000 to 8,000 men, 
divided into three columns, departed 
the city of  Calais on August 4, 1373. 
Strangely, they did not travel directly 
south but instead traveled southeast 
around Paris through the Champagne 
region. Though they had wrought a 
were provided with monetary incentive. 
Rather than maintaining an army by 
feudal means, the French soldiers under 
the constable were paid. Du Guesclin 
successfully maintained this small, 
professional French force, with money 
allocated by the French government:
Bertrand du Guesclin, duc de 
Molines, connestable de France, à nostre 
amé Estienne Braque, thresorier des 
guerres du Roy nostre sire ou à son 
lieutenant, salut. Nous vous envoions 
enclose sous nostre scel du secret le 
monstre de onze cent trente et cinq 
homes d’armes, lesquels nous avons 
retenus pour server le Roy nostre sire 
en ces presentes guerres sous nostre 
gouvernement, dont il y a quatre 
Chevaliers Bannerets, cinquante et un 
Chevaliers Bacheliers, et mil quatre vingt 
Escuiers de nostre compaignie reçeus 
par nous à Paris le i. jour de Janiver 1’an 
1370. Si vous mandons que pour toutes 
lesdites gens vous nous faciez prest et 
payement de leurs gages en la manière 
qu’il appartiendra. Donnè audit lieu sous 
nostre secret 1’an et jour dessus dit. Par 
mons, le Connestable36
This system of  pay allowed du 
Guesclin to maintain a standing and 
well-disciplined army composed of  
French soldiers. The fact that these 
troops were recruited for long term 
use as opposed to a brief  campaign, 
implies that they embodied a level of  
military professionalism similar to the 
armies of  the military revolution. With 
this small, exclusive fighting force, du 
Guesclin implemented a strategy that was 
ultimately successful in turning the tide 
against England.
Du Guesclin would conduct warfare 
reminiscent to what the French had done 
during Edward III’s 1359 campaign. 
42. Barbara W. Tuchman, A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century (New York: Penguin Random House, 1978), 286.
43. Froissart, Chronicles, 188.
44. Nicolle, The Great Chevauchée, 55.  
45. Ibid., 58.
46. Ibid., 59.
47. Sumption, Divided Houses, 194.
48. Nicolle, The Great Chevauchée, 68.
49. Tuchman, A Distant Mirror, 287.
50. Sumption, Divided Houses, 139-141.
51. Perroy, The Hundred Years War, 168.
52. Seward, The Hundred Years War, 116-117.
53. Corrigan, A Great and Glorious Adventure, 183-184.
52
GVSU McNair Scholars Journal
Charles V and du Guesclin. Why is this? 
Surely the tactics of  Charles V and the 
preference toward a professional force 
rather than a feudal one fit into the 
larger military revolution. The easiest 
explanation for this dismissal lies within 
Henry V’s victory at Agincourt in 1415. 
What overshadows the late 14th century 
changes in French military policy is not 
the fact that Agincourt was an English 
victory, but that the French essentially 
abandoned Charles V’s military ideals 
and reverted to tactics that had failed 
them at Crécy and Poitiers. The battle of  
Agincourt would have never happened 
during the reign of  Charles V, but his time 
had ended and so had French dominance.
Henry V landed in France in August 
1415 and besieged the city of  Harfleur 
between August 18 and September 
22. The siege of  Harfleur, which had 
taken far longer than Henry had hoped, 
was hardly a worthy prize for such a 
momentous campaign; Henry wanted 
more. Despite the fact that the army had 
suffered tremendous losses both from the 
fighting and dysentery, Henry decided 
to take his ragged army on a chevauchée 
toward the English garrison of  Calais.54 
During the long trek, the French army 
marched parallel to Henry’s force as they 
sought a crossing of  the Somme. Using 
tactics similar to John of  Gaunt’s raid in 
1373, the French pursued the English, 
making river crossings difficult.55 French 
maneuvering prevented large scale 
destruction as Henry marched; however, 
on October 25th, previous tactical doctrine 
was tossed aside as the French accepted 
an open field challenge.
 The battle of  Agincourt is considered 
one of  England’s greatest victories. 
Estimates for the English strength vary 
from 5,000 to 8,000 while the French 
numbered an estimated 30,000. Similar 
to the English Crécy and Poitiers, Henry’s 
army was positioned with men at arms 
due to Charles V and du Guesclin’s 
ability to recognize the failures of  their 
predecessors and adapt. Their tactics, 
though considered “the direct antithesis 
of  combat for honor”49 were effective in 
bringing about French victory.
The French had made a tremendous 
comeback; however hostilities continued 
through the 1370s. These included 
the 1377 French raids on the English 
homeland. A period of  French naval 
dominance was initiated by the naval 
victory of  La Rochelle in late June 
1372 where a large allied Castilian fleet 
defeated an English fleet under the Duke 
of  Pembroke.50 During the years following 
La Rochelle, French naval efforts grew; 
along with a large requisition of  merchant 
ships for conversion, the Clos des Galées 
at Rouen launched over forty warships 
between 1376 and 1377.51 Along with 
this newly christened fleet, French naval 
officer Jean de Vienne took control 
of  naval affairs with the purpose of  
maintaining French control of  the English 
Channel. During the summer months of  
1377, the Franco-Castilian fleet raided 
the English coast, burning villages and 
claiming plunder until they were repelled 
by English forces at Southampton.52 This 
strategy, although not as successful as 
the chevauchées of  the Black Prince, was 
an undeniable sign that the tables had 
turned. English endeavors during the 
latter 1370s included a failed chevauchée 
by the newly crowned Richard II’s uncle 
the Duke of  Buckingham who, like John 
of  Gaunt, failed to bring the French to 
battle.53 The hostilities came to a close in 
1389 when a truce was signed; though it 
was only meant as a temporary halt to 
the war, no major campaigns would be 
conducted until late 1415 when Henry V 
reignited the war.
 As heroic as this period of  French 
resurgence is, military revolution theorists 
tend to dismiss the military doctrine of  
 As with Edward III’s expedition 
in 1359, it was obvious that an English 
army conducting such a long campaign 
in France would rely on foraging for the 
acquisition of  food and other supplies. 
In early October, the French populace 
near Avallon were ordered to bring all 
food supplies into walled cities as well as 
deconstruct mills in order to deny their 
use by the English.46 In addition to the 
shortage of  food supplies, the French 
were still in pursuit of  the English as they 
crossed the Loire and Allier rivers. In 
order to maintain distance, the English 
left their entire baggage train at the bank 
of  the Allier. The loss of  the baggage 
train came at the worst possible time, for 
the English force continued on through 
the winter months in territory with few 
inhabitants and bereft of  food.47 By the 
time the expedition reached Bordeaux 
on Christmas Eve of  1373, most of  
the horses had died. Many of  the men 
entered the city without mounts or 
armor.48 John of  Gaunt’s great raid, 
covering nearly 900km of  French 
countryside had been a monumental 
failure. The failure of  the Chevauchée, due 
largely to the unwillingness of  the French 
to fight an open battle, proved once 
again that English tactics reminiscent of  
the Crécy and Poitiers campaigns were 
ineffective against Charles V’s France.
 Charles V, along with commanders 
such as Bertrand du Guesclin had by 
1374 reduced English holdings to what 
they had been previous to the battle of  
Crécy in 1346. Looking back on the 
Crécy and Poitiers campaigns, it is clear 
that the French were capable of  victory. 
English tactics during Charles V’s reign 
were largely identical to what they were 
when the war began; however, the lack 
of  a centralized command structure 
under Philip VI and John II prevented 
wise tactical decisions from being made. 
This period of  French resurgence was 
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Charles V’s reign. Why did the French 
combat Henry’s army at Agincourt with 
tactics that had proved so disastrous 
against Edward III and the Prince of  
Wales? Why did they give battle at all? 
The answer to this question lies within the 
simple fact that Charles V had essentially 
ended the war. As mentioned previously, 
English holdings had been reduced to 
what they had been before Edward III’s 
first successful invasion.61 Despite a few 
raids conducted by both sides, the fighting 
would not be reignited in earnest until 
Henry’s invasion in 1415. There was no 
need to expend large amounts of  time 
and treasure implementing a new military 
doctrine during peacetime. As a result 
of  this hiatus, Charles V’s tactics faded 
from memory. By the time the war began 
anew, the French, now fractured by civil 
war and under the ineffective leadership 
of  Charles VI, reverted to what they 
knew best, traditional feudalism. Though 
the French had abandoned Charles V’s 
military policies, the suffering wrought by 
Henry V was only temporary. The French 
would once again rise and a military 
doctrine similar to that of  Charles V’s 
would emerge.
The year 1429 initiated a period of  
resurgence for the French. The French 
dauphin, Charles VII, was approached 
by a young woman from Lorraine who 
claimed to be sent by God to relieve 
the French city of  Orléans on the Loire 
River. The young woman, Jeanne 
d’Arc, broke the siege of  Orléans rather 
quickly; conducting all out assaults on 
the English defenses rather than setting 
up for a prolonged encirclement.62 In 
July of  1429, Jeanne and her army had 
successfully reached the city of  Reims 
where Charles VII was crowned king of  
France. Jeannes’s success, however great, 
was to be short-lived; during the siege of  
Compiegne in 1430, Jeanne was captured 
by the Burgundians and soon sold to and 
executed by the English.63 As tragic as 
Jeanne’s death was, it was not a major 
detriment to the French war effort, for 
under Charles VII, France would soon 
claim the final victory.
The reign of  Charles VII brought 
in the center with a wing of  archers on 
each flank. Abandoning all tactics of  the 
du Guesclin era, the French commenced 
their attack with a cavalry charge as they 
had done over sixty years earlier at Crécy. 
Over 1,000 mounted knights charged the 
English lines in hopes of  cutting down 
the longbowmen and were subsequently 
shot down.56 Following the failed cavalry 
attack, the main French attack came in 
the form of  dismounted men at arms. 
Thousands of  heavily armored French 
knights, in a manner reminiscent of  
John II’s main attack at Poitiers, trudged 
through the muddy field over the bodies 
of  their dead comrades, all while taking 
constant arrow fire from the English 
flanks. By the time the attack reached 
the English center, the French knights 
were exhausted; they had little chance 
against the English men at arms who had 
simply waited for their approach.57 The 
only French success at Agincourt was an 
attack made on the English baggage train. 
However, evidence shows that the attack 
was made by lowly thieves rather than 
armored knights, for the French could not 
spare them. Henry’s lines were in no way 
compromised by the raid on the baggage, 
which accomplished little more than 
the theft of  some of  the king’s personal 
belongings.58 Agincourt was a disaster for 
the French army; their losses numbered 
nearly 10,000 with over 1,500 taken 
prisoner while English losses totaled no 
more than 500.59 Agincourt was a failure 
on the part of  the French command to 
maintain the discipline that had been 
learned during Charles V’s reign. As a 
result of  this setback, the English would 
have the upper hand for the next decade.
 Agincourt inaugurated a period 
of  English dominance; by 1420, the 
English had claimed the throne of  France, 
accomplishing what Edward III had set 
out to do nearly a century before. On 
May 19, 1420, the Treaty of  Troyes was 
signed. The treaty recognized Henry as 
the heir of  King Charles VI, while the 
dauphin (Charles VII) lost his claim.60 
Henry V’s victory at Agincourt and 
acquisition of  the French throne, muddled 
French military accomplishments during 
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about a new age for the French military. 
The military reforms enacted by Charles 
were key factors to the French end 
game. Among these changes was the 
military reform of  1439; this reform 
or “Ordonnance” enacted a military 
system based on paid, professional troops. 
Unlike the English soldiers of  the war 
who were released from service at the 
end of  a campaign, the new French army 
was to be maintained both in time of  
war and peace.64 The new military was 
divided into what were known as the 
Compagnies d’ordonnance; the men of  
these companies were experienced soldiers. 
Like the routiers, these companies had the 
tendency to cause havoc throughout the 
French countryside; however, a system 
of  monthly payment was arranged to 
keep up moral standards and discipline.65 
Artillery was also a major component 
of  Charles VII’s military reform and as 
Rogers expresses, a crucial component 
in the final stages of  the Hundred Years 
War. What made this large adoption of  
gunpowder weaponry unique was the fact 
that a large number of  artillery pieces 
were being brought together. Additionally, 
artillery officers were appointed, such as 
Jean and Gaspard Bureau, who ensured a 
level of  professionalism amongst French 
artillerists.66 The French artillery train, 
coupled with professional artillerists won 
the final victory on July 16, 1453 at the 
battle of  Castillon. The battle began when 
English Lord John Talbot led an attack on 
a French force near Castillon. After forcing 
a part of  the French army to retreat, 
Talbot ordered an attack on a nearby 
French artillery park where a large number 
of  guns had been arranged. As the English 
approached the park, the French cannon 
inflicted devastating losses on the English 
who were soon defeated. By the end of  
1453, the English held only a sliver of  land 
near the city of  Calais.67 Charles VII’s 
military reforms had successfully ended the 
war.
Charles VII’s military system, besides 
the massed artillery, bears a strong 
resemblance to the armies under Charles 
V and du Guesclin. A significant difference 
between these two systems is the level 
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of  credit ascribed to them. Historians find 
it difficult to consider du Guesclin and 
Charles V’s era as part of  a larger military 
evolution because of  Henry V’s successes 
and the French failure to permanently 
adopt Charles V’s military policies. 
Rogers’ discussion of  Charles VII’s 
adoption of  massed artillery is likely due 
to the fact that they were a large part of  
the final French victory and subsequently 
a much more visible example of  a larger 
progression in European warfare. Despite 
this fact, one cannot ignore the similarities 
that Charles VII’s military doctrine 
bears to that of  his grandfather. Without 
Charles V’s military doctrine, Charles VII 
would have had no model to follow, and 
as a result, his military reforms may have 
been quite different. 
The Hundred Years War brought 
about many military changes one can 
accurately attribute to Roberts’ military 
revolution. The wealth of  Anglo-centric 
scholarship illustrates a clear relationship 
between the English military system and 
the military revolution while a much less 
diverse pool of  sources makes French 
military change far less defined. Through 
careful analysis, it becomes increasingly 
clear that French military innovation 
throughout the latter half  of  the 14th 
century can be accurately categorized 
as revolutionary. The guerrilla tactics 
of  Charles V and Bertrand du Guesclin 
paired with their preference towards 
wage-based troops were successful in 
rendering English tactics useless. 
Additionally, they promoted a level 
of  military professionalism that largely 
prevented the failures of  Philip VI and 
John II from being repeated. Though 
these ideals were not carried over to 
the early 15th century, Charles VII’s 
military reforms, largely reflecting his 
grandfather’s military ethos, allowed 
France to claim the final victory. The 
overarching influence of  Charles V’s 
military ideals earns him a rightful place 
in the military revolution.
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